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"WE MUST BE HUNTERS OF MEANING":1
RACE, METAPHOR, AND THE MODELS
OF STEVEN WINTER*
D. Marvin Jones'
INTRODUCTION
As a black male I have tried to come to grips with why,
unless I'm wearing a suit, whites generally will not sit beside
me on the train, why when I walk down the street lined with
cars I am treated to a symphony of automatic door locks going
off, why I cannot catch a cab in New York.
I teach Criminal Procedure, a course in which the issue
of racial profiles is very much a topic of discussion. Racial
profiling is something that occurs against the backdrop of
* 02002 D. Marvin Jones. All Rights Reserved.
Professor of Law, University of Miami.
The phrase is from JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, "WHAT IS LITERATURE" AND OTHER
ESSAYS 4 (1988). The full quote is "We would be hunters of meaning, we would speak
the truth about the world and our own lives." Id. Sartre's "hunt" or search was for
human possibilities in the midst of the moral complexity of WWU. Sartre's "hunt7 for
truth assumed that the truth is something that is obscured by our classical
assumptions in philosophy and that could be gotten at only by exploring certain things
which are interior to the human condition. For example Sartre sought to understand
the basic impulse to produce writing or art. I chose this phrase because I believe that
both Steve's project and mine hinge on a similar search for interior sources. Steve
focuses on materials from cognitive psychology to map the mind itself in order to
expose the internal architecture of legal reasoning. I focus on language to expose the
"architecture" of racial identity. We both conduct our search amidst an equally complex
discursive moment.
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racial stereotypes and myths. Not so long ago at an affair for
the law school I came dressed in a dark suit. One of my older
white colleagues came up to me and asked, with a smile, "What
are you doing dressed like that? Are you going to rob a bank?"
In his day Dubois stated the essence of the black experience
through the question, "How does it feel to be a problem?"' In
the midst of the twenty-first century the question seems to
have become, "How does it feel to be a myth?"
I see myself in the vignette told about Miles Davis who,
living in a predominantly white neighborhood, was reduced to
having to telephone the police to warn them whenever he went
out. I see myself in the experience of Al Joyner, an Olympic
bronze medallist who no longer drives in Los Angeles because
of police harassment. I see myself in the experience of Earl
Graves, Ivy League graduate, elegantly dressed businessman,
publisher of Black Enterprise Magazine, being stopped and
frisked, briefcase in hand, by policeman searching for a
criminal described only as a black man with short hair.
I am haunted by Mr. Stuart's story about a black man
in a rumpled jogging suit who robbed him and his wife, killed
her, shot him and escaped in the darkness.3 After an extensive
manhunt for the man in the rumpled jogging suit, he was later
revealed to be a fiction, made up by Mr. Stuart to cover his own
murder of his wife. Susan Smith told a similar story about a
black man, wearing a watch cap, who hijacked her car and
kidnapped her two small kids. 4 It turned out the black male
kidnapper in the watch cap was a cardboard cut out of a
bogeyman. The real kidnapper was Susan Smith herself: She
invented the mysterious black male to hide her own media-like
murder of her kids.
2 W.E.B. Dubois in his great work, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK, wrote:
Between me and the other world there is an unasked question:
unasked by some through feelings of delicacy; by others through the
difficulty of rightly framing it. All nevertheless flutter 'round it. They
approach me in a half-hesitant sort of way .... How does it feel to be
a problem? Then it dawned on me with a certain suddenness that I
was different from the others; or like mayhap in heart and life and
longing, but shut out of their world by a vast veil
W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOuLS OF BLACK FOLK 7-9 (John Edgar Wideman ed., 1990).
3 Larry Marx et al., A Murderous Hoax, NEWSWEEK. Jan. 22, 1990, at 16.
4 Gary Lee & Bobby Vobejda, In S. Carolina, an Angry Arraignment; Mob at
Courthouse Jeers Woman Who Concocted Tale of Sons' Abduction, WASH. POST, Nov. 5,
1994, at Al.
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Why was Mr. Stuart or Susan Smith believed?
It may have something to do with what Jesse Jackson
said: He feels relieved when he finds, walking in his Chicago
neighborhood that it is a "white man" that is walking behind
him. Apparently, in the words of Cecil Taylor, we are as males
black even to ourselves.'
I experience these narratives not merely as familiar,
troubling anecdotes, but as memory. I remember Miles and Al
Joyner and Earl Graves; I remember also Emmet Till,' and the
Scottsboro Boys.' I remember walking behind others and
sensing their fear. I remember these stories as stories both
about my own identity and about identity as trope.
I. LOCATING THE CONCEPT OF RACE
For me the work of Professor Steven Winter is seminal.9
Steve has a soul, which seeks to map the structure of legal
thought, its beginnings, sources, and foundations. This
6 Paul Glastris; Jeannye Thornton, A New Civil'Rights Frontier, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Jan. 17, 1994, at 38. The full quote is, "There is nothing more painful for
me at this stage in my life than to walk down the street and hear footsteps and start to
think about robbery and then look around and see it's somebody white and feel
relieved. How humiliating." Id.
6 D. Marvin Jones, We're All Stuck Here For a While: Law and the Social
Construction of the Black Male, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 35, 37 (1998).
7 Emmet Till was a black Chicago boy who, in 1955, went to Mississippi to
visit his relatives. Allegedly he whistled at a white woman. Subsequently, he was
lynched. In the case of Emmet Till lynching took the form of being garroted with
barbed wire, doused with gasoline and set alight. The picture of his mutilated body was
prominently displayed by Jet magazine. The lynching of Emmett Till is the kind of
story that crystallizes the larger narrative of persecution of black men to maintain
racial hierarchy. For a detailed account of the Emmett Till story see STEPHEN J.
WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF Em mETf TILL (1988).
8 The Scottsboro boys were a group of nine black men charged with rape in
Alabama. The women the men were accused of raping were later revealed to be
prostitutes. The charge of rape followed a fight in which a group of white youths lost.
The charges were false. The black youths were convicted in a trial in which they had no
counsel They spent ten years in jail before the Supreme Court reversed their
convictions because of this lack of counsel. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
For more detail on the story of the Scottsboro boys see generally DAN T. CARTER,
SCOTrSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969).
9Here I refer not to a particular article but to the body of thought that
Winter's work represents. The relationship that Winter drew between law and
cognitive structures linked to language creates an angle of vision to understand the
law in new ways. See, e.g., Steven L.. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the
Problem of Self.Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
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mapping, which located critical intersections between law and
cognitive psychology, has informed my own.
As Steve might be paraphrased to say, law is not
freestanding. Legal doctrine rests on certain shared
assumptions about meaning. I would refer to these
assumptions as a paradigm.0 In its simplest terms a, paradigm
is a model. But by paradigm I mean something closer to a pre-
existing conceptual image, which is always in the background.
Thus, as Thomas Kuhn has written, our perception of the
world is not separate from our pontifical images of it:
Something like a paradigm is prerequisite to perception itself. What
a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what
his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see. In
the absence of such training there can only be, in William James's
phrase, "a blooming' buzzing' confusion."
The thrust of Steve's work has been to interrogate the
paradigm of legal thought, to challenge its pretensions, its
arrogance. He locates it outside of the realm of "pure reason" in
the pre-rational or antirational realm of language and
cognition. I am interested in interrogating paradigms too. The
paradigm I want to interrogate is the paradigm of race.
10 Professor Winter in his early work refers to these cognitive structures as
Idealized Cognitive Models. See Winter, supra note 9, at 1385. Listen to Winter as he
explains,
What explains this phenomenon is the notion that categories have an
internal structure which produces these perceptions of best examples.
The claim is that categories are structured by means of idealized
cognitive models-culturally shared "theories" of how to organize some
portion of our experience. These models may be organized in terms of
image-schemata like the source-path-goal schema or in terms of a
group of related propositions grounded in a physical/cultural
experience. An example is the stereotypical conceptualization of
.mother" by means of an idealized cognitive model that assumes
natural childbirth by a woman who is married to the biological father,
and who is also the primary nurturer and full-time caretaker of the
child. Women who fit this idealized cognitive model are prototypical
"mothers" and are referred to as such. But no prototypical mothers are
marked as such by the linguistic conventions resulting from this
model: They are stepmothers, surrogate mothers, biological mothers,
foster mothers, working mothers, or unwed mothers.
Id.
1 THoMAs S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 113 (2d ed.
1970).
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In legal discourse, race is posited as a fact. It is
presented as something objective, natural, and inevitable.
Recall, for example, in Plessy v. Ferguson' how the Court
premised the reasonableness of segregation on the fact that
race was a natural category:
If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be
the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's
merits and a voluntary consent of individuals .... Legislation is
powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions
based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only
result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation.
Plessy was, in a real sense, the point where the modern
discourse about civil rights begins. It starts with the notion of
segregation as a morally corrupt regime based on individual
prejudice. This paradigm of individual prejudice visualizes the
problem as one involving in Gordon Allport's terms, irrational
assumptions based on race.4 This paradigm is given content by
our historical experience and by the.narrative which emerges
from the civil rights struggle, whjh followed Plessy and
culminated in the 1950s.
This is the story of the civil rights movement. It is the
story of America's moral transformation. It is a story of a
Manichean struggle between the forces of darkness and the
forces of light: of Americans armed with fundamental
American values triumphing over white extremists. In the
story, southern whites turned water hoses on blacks, lynched
black men, and burned crosses on the lawn of black families as
a warning to those who would challenge the regime of racial
caste. According to this story, the whites who engaged in these
acts of hostility were extremists and by definition abnormal:
they were "bad white people.""2 The climax of this drama occurs
when the good white people passed civil rights laws in the
12 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
" Id. at 551.
14 Allport develops the hypothesis that racism is an irrational response to the
neutral fact of race. He goes on to hypothesize that these attitudes flourish in a social
environment of racial separation and ignorance. See GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE
OF RACE PREDJUDICE 261- 81 (1954).
15 Alan Freeman, Legitimating Racial *Discrimination Through Anti-
Discrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049 (1978).
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1960s, in a definitive victory over the bad ones. Racism appears
in this story as something akin to sexual lust-a deviant
impulse which good, normal white people repress but
extremists, bad people, give into. This Freudian notion-of
racism as a deviant impulse-finds synergy with our sense of
our own modernity: that we are grounded in scientific
rationality."6 This rationality is expressed not only in our
investment in technology but in the rule of law, which is to say,
today, "equal justice under law."
In my understanding, the wrong unit of inquiry is being
used: race is an artifact of culture. Plessy's stigma flowed from
the racial hierarchy that segregation imposed in terms of jobs
and social privilege generally. Sitting in a separate railroad car
took on its meaning from this larger phenomenon of racial
caste. Race and discrimination can only be given meaning by
social practices, not individual decisionmaking:
[H]istory and the social milieu in which we are situated create the
significance of a biased decision. As such, discrimination cannot be
reduced to an isolated sequence of a wrongful state of mind leading
to an inequitable decision. . . . Genuine disparities may occur
without an employer's wrongful state of mind. More importantly, a
single employer with a wrongful state of mind cannot cause the
stigma of discrimination because discrimination can only be
constituted by social practice and requires a social or historical
dimension to exist.7
To the extent that race is a problem of stereotypical
images embedded in language there is a dimension of
"unconsciousness" but not in Freud's sense.
It is wrong to think that the unconscious exists because of the
existence of unconscious desire, of some obtuse ... animalistic...
desire that rises up from the depths and has to lift itself to a higher
level of consciousness. Quite on the contrary, desire exists because
there is unconsciousness, that is to say, language, which escapes the
's See BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLITICS IN PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION (1995). Santos argues that
modernity is held up by the binding of two opposites: institutions of "regulation" and
institutions of "emancipation." The emancipatory aspect of modernity is defined by the
impulse toward "rationality." This emancipatory impulse is anchored by science, art,
and the rule of law.
17 D. Marvin Jones, The Death of the Employer: Image, Text, and Title VII, 45
VAND. L. REV. 349, 366 (1992).
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subject ... and because there is always, on the level of language,
something, which is beyond consciousness....
[Furthermore,] [tihe ... unconscious is therefore not so much the
dark inner reservoir of desire and instinct which used to be our
image of the Freudian id, occasionally breaking into the realm of
consciousness or insinuating its way there through the disguises of
dreams. Rather it is an absolute transparency, an order which is
unconscious simply because it is infinitely vaster than our individual
minds, and because they owe their development to their positions
within it. 
8
Much has been written about race as a problem of
coercive force, the realm of politics. I want to shift the focus to
the extent to which subordination is premised on consent.
The starting point in my redescription of race, which
was treated as fact both by the law and those, like Martin
Luther King, who sought to change it," is to focus not on the
morality of segregation but on the incoherence of its
assumptions. One tries in vain to locate the objective
boundaries of race: there are none. Race does not exist within
the terrain of objectivity.
As Anthony Apia has noted, "the truth is there are no
races.... Talk of race is particularly distressing... for where
race works-it does so only at the price of biologizing what is...
ideology. Stated another way:
What constitutes a race and how one recognizes a racial difference
are culturally determined. Whether two individuals regard
themselves as of the same or of different races depends not on the
degree of similarity of their genetic material but on whether history
'a FREDERICK JAMESON, THE PRISON HOUSE OF LANGUAGE 137 1972)
(emphasis added).
I'  still remember King's speech about how painful it was for him to "explain"
to his daughter that the reason she could not go to an amusement park (Funtown) is
because she is black: "But when you have seen vicious mobs lynch your mothers and
fathers at will...when you suddenly find your tongue twisted and your speech
stammering as you seek to explain to your six-year-old daughter why she can't go to
the public amusement park that has just been advertised on television, and see tears
welling up in her eyes when she is told that Funtown is closed to colored
children...then you will understand why it is difficult to wait." Dr. Martin Luther King,
Why We Can't Wait, Letter from the Birmingham Jail, Apr. 16, 1963, in A TESTAMENT
OF HOPE (James Washington ed., 1986).
20 Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: Dubois and the Illusion of
Race, in HENRY LOUIS GATES, RACE, WRITmI AND DIFFERENCE 21 (1986).
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tradition, and personal training and experiences have brought them
to regard themselves as belonging to the same group or to different
groups. Since all human beings are of one species and since all
populations tend to merge when they exist in contact, group
differentiation will be based on cultural behavior and not genetic
differences.2'
It is elementary of critical theory to see that race is a
construct. In Steve's early work he wrote a great deal about
metaphor as a cognitive structure.' I have stood on Steve's
shoulders in developing my understanding of race. In my early
work I went on to identify race not merely as construct or
fiction but as a metaphor.
My use of the word metaphor combines two concepts.
The first I trace to Aristotle. Aristotle's deceptively simple
characterization was that metaphor consists of giving the thing
a name that belongs to something else; the transference being
either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from
species to species or on grounds of analogy.' As such, all
metaphors are on their face what Gilbert Ryle called category
mistakes.' The significance of this seeming mistake is that
metaphors have as their ambition a redescription of reality.
In giving to the genus the name of species... and vice versa one
simultaneously recognizes and transgresses the logical structure of
language.... [I]t involves taking one thing for another by a sort of
calculated error.... To affect just one word, the metaphor has to
disturb a whole network by means of an aberrant attribution....
[Mietaphor destroys an order only to invent a new one: and the
category mistake is nothing but the complement of the language of
discovery.... [Mietaphor bears information because it "redescribes
reality."
2
Race is also a metaphor in the sense used by George
Lakoff.' For Lakoff, a metaphor is a linguistic structure which
21 JAMES C. KING, THE BIOLOGY OF RACE 155-57 (1981).
See generally Winter, supra note 9; see also Steven L. Winter,
Indeterminancy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441(1990).
PAUL RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR 21-22 (R. Czerny tran., 1975).
24 See GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 16 (1949).
RICOEUR, supra note 23, at 21-22.
26 See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, WOMEN, FIRE AND DANGEROUS
THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 113 (1987).
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allows us to make sense of our conceptual universe by
providing experiential referent for abstract notionsY Thus, we
often speak of carrying one's burden in legal argument. A
burden is something one carries along a road. The image of a
road provides a visual image to anchor conceptual structures.
In both concepts the metaphor serves a cognitive role
mediating between, anchoring, and giving content to the
concepts of our imagination.
Race is a metaphor in the sense that it links the
physical body with a racial body, which exists only in the realm
of cultural meaning. The difficulty is that, through this
mechanism of metaphor we conflate the real with the cultural
image.
Thus, in my early work I located the problem of race
within the realm of language and metaphor. Professor Winter
has attempted to shift the paradigm from law as a problem of
reason to the problem of discerning the interior architecture of
the reasoning process-a cognitive structure. Interestingly, our
racial discourse has proceeded as if the problem were a failure
of individuals to reason properly. For me, what is interior to
the problem of racial subordination is a set of meanings
crystallized as images, which operate as windows on the social
world, windows operating for both oppressor, and oppressed.'
2 Id.
28
MY APPROACH CONVENTIONAL LEGAL THEORY
What is Race: A signifying practice A label real or constructed.
and a social practice in which
meaning and societal dysfunction are
mutually entailed. Race may be used
as a verb: People are raced.
Unit of Inquiry- Culture. The individual.
Source of Difficulty: Language. Irrational thinking or bigoted
thoughts or both generally (some
theorists give this a materialist spin
tracing racism to an ideology in the
service of political-economic or
legal order).
Nature of Difficulty: Cognitive A moral problem.
difficulty.
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II. CLAIMS OF KNOWLEDGE
To understand the shift that is necessary, let me share
a few stories. The stones are drawn from my upcoming book
Race, Sex, and Suspicion. Let us begin with the claim that race
is a problem of faulty thinking or irrationality. On the
contrary, I argue the problem has to do with claims of
knowledge. The classic instance is the racial profile. Let me
begin my first story.
A. The Story of Henry Bibb9
In 1837, Henry Bibb boldly escaped from a plantation in
Kentucky and crossed the border into Canada." Soon after
Bibb returned in disguise-he put on false whiskers-to get his
wife and child. Once back in the "occupied territory" of
slavocratic Kentucky he took work digging a cellar for "the
good Lady where I was stopping.""' Of course the whiskers did
not hide who he was. In a more recent context, O.J. Simpson
allegedly committed the murders wearing a sailor's watch cap
and a blue blazer with gold buttons. Johnny Cochran,
ridiculing the suggestion that such a costume could conceal
O.J. in all his celebrity exclaimed, "This is no disguise!" An
ante-bellum Johnnie Cochran might have exclaimed the same
thing about Henry Bibb's efforts to mask his own identity. The
slave catchers soon "recognized" Bibb and, treating him like a
nineteenth century public enemy number one, surrounded the
house in force and arrested him at gunpoint. In the story, he
poignantly asks his capturers, "What crime had I committed."'
His question, which went unanswered, still echoes down the
corridors of history.
Bibb, in asking his question invoked Lockeann notions
of the natural rights. Locke postulated that all men are by
29Excerpt from D. Marvin Jones, Crimes of Identity: The Birth of the Racial
Profile, in RACE, SEX, AND SUSPICION (forthcoming 2002) (unpublished manuscript on
file with author).
"0 PU'rIN ON OL' MASSA 81-87 (Gilbert Osofsky ed., 1969).
' 
11d. at 90.32 Id. at 91.
"See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1967)
(1689).
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nature free and enter society with natural rights. Jefferson's
notion that "all men are endowed by their creator with an
inalienable rights to liberty" imported this natural law thesis
into the American scene. The social contract which emerges
from this confers the right to liberty-to freedom subject to the
condition that the individual does not break the law. Bibb
implicitly invoked both Jefferson and Locke, both natural law
and the social contract, in his question to his abductors. If he is
a man, and if all men by nature are free, then he Bibb was also
free-unless he had done something wrong. The issue becomes
what is Bibb's crime? He is innocent not merely of the crime of
harming others, he is innocent of being the native or savage
associated with slavery: by the very act of thinking and
writing. Yet despite his radical innocence he is hunted and
chained as a prisoner and criminal.
Bibb claimed his freedom by rhetorically situating
himself within the circle formed by the liberal narrative not
merely of the American Revolution but of the enlightenment
itself-a narrative of individual autonomy and freedom. This
story of the enlightenment is eclipsed by an older story. This
was the narrative of racial essences, a narrative which was
given voice by Justice Taney in Dred Scott:
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of
an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white
race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that
they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and
that the Negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for
his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary
article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made
by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the
civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in
morals as well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or
supposed to be open to dispute; and men in every grade and position
in society daily and habitually acted upon it in their private
pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern, without doubting
for a moment the correctness of this opinion. 34
As I read Taney's decision, the social contract ran only
to those who were white. Blacks were not only persons without
rights to a social contract; they were not persons at all. Bibb, in
- Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).
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invoking the notion of "innocence," crossed the moral line
between subject and object, self and other. In the mirror of his
imagination, Bibb saw himself as a free man unjustly chained.
Bibb simply posited that he was free. In so doing, in his mind,
he tore away the veil of race. But this subjective image was as
distant from objective reality as heaven was from the terrain of
the plantation. The dreamer physically remained imprisoned
behind the iron curtain of the slavery-behind the veil. The
slave was forced to recognize that regardless of what moral
transformation he might achieve, no matter how he came to
view himself, this did not affect his objective status. For the
slave, his identity was defined by how whites saw him. He was
both blessed and cursed by what W.E.B. Dubois calls a "double
consciousness."35
The Negro is a seventh son born with a veil, and gifted with second
sight in this American world-a world which yields him no true self-
consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation
of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double
consciousness, this sense of always... measuring one's soul by the
tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.
3
6
Thus, as Sterling Bland writes, "African-Americans are
limited by the exterior manifestations of social response and
are thus able to ... be seen only through the "revelation of the
other world."'
The reason Bibb's mask of whiskers does not work is
because Bibb's appearance as a threat was not linked to any
set of features which could be seen-and therefore disguised.
Bibb is a criminal because of his race. Race, in turn, is not
something that can be seen.
Race itself has never been seen by the naked eye. Beyond merely
describing morphological characteristics, race refers to an
35 DUBOIS, supra note 2, at 3.
36 Id.
37 STERLING LESTER BLAND, RUNAWAY SLAVE STORIES AND THEIR FICTIONS OF
SELF-CREATION 8(2000).
38 The origins of the word race are unsure. As Wilton Krogman has written
It may be kin to the Czechrazs, referring to artery or blood, or Latin
generation or old French generace. It seems to trace back most directly
to Basque arraca or arraze, referring to male stud animal. It is also
found in the southern Spanish race, of Arabic derivation, meaning
1082 [Vol. 67: 4
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amorphous concept of difference between human "types." What
constitutes a "type" and what constitutes a difference is contested
territory and for some refers to essences, for others to biology but
always to a set of abstract rules of recognition." These rules of
recognition impose upon perception a kind of grammar, commanding
us, at the deep level of how we see the world, to parse persons we
encounter into different categories. Race is visualized not through
actual observations but through the minds eye, by "seeing" human
populations as naturally, actually parsed into distinctive sub-groups.
The lens through which the meaning of race is seen to be
illuminated and race "as a fact" finally discerned is our sense of who
we are. We actually see race though our I/eye4 or sense of identity,
as an alternating image of those who are like us, within our circle of
community, and those who are not.41
Race is an inference we make based on a variety of criteria
ranging from color to birth records. Race is a faceless prototype
of a racial other. Bibb matched the prototype regardless of how
he changed his features. He fit the profile.2
head, or ... In 1684 in France we find "especes ou races d'homme" in
the sense of referring to stem or family.
WILTON KROGIAN, The Concept of Race, in THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN THE WORLD CRISIS
39 (Ralph Linton ed., 1945).
Although race originates in the ethos of culture we confront it as an
authoritarian figure, much the same as we confront a statute or law. Of course, the
level at which we confront race, the level of metaphor, is a level addressed to cognition.
See generally LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 26. Lakoff and Johnson have shed much
light on how our conceptual world is linked to our perception and cognitive processes.
The linchpin of connection is what Lakoff and Johnson refer to as "metaphor."
Metaphor is a linking together of an abstract thing with something'we perceive or
sense. Thus, we derive a notion of argument in which we often speak of in terms of
burdens from something we have seen, the image or metaphor of a path. Similarly,
race as a metaphor, or icancantation of metaphors is linked to something we have seen:
blood and color. Race works as metaphor by linking abstract ideas about human types
with observations of the human body, with something actually perceived. Again all this
occurs at a cognitve level. Law, on the other hand is explicitly addressed to the level of
decisonmaking and conscious thought. Nonetheless, the analogy is there and the term
rules of recognition, H. L. A. Harts phrase, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
(1961), is helpful in understanding the nature of legal rules is helpful to understanding
race as a linguistic one.
40 Ralph Ellison refers to this, after Thomas Aquinas, as the "inner eye," the
"eye[ ] with which they look through their physical eyes upon reality." Ralph Ellison,
THE INVISIBLE MAN 3 (1989). See also CORNEL WEST, PROPHETIC VISIONS 102 (1988)
(referring to the cognitive structure by which race is identified as "the eye of the mind,"
a conception of the faculty by which we 'perceive' the abstract he traces to the ancient
Greeks). 41 D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible, 82 GEO. L.J. 437, 449 (1993).
42 1 would define a profile as a prototypical image of a criminal. By definition
there is a close kinship between profile and stereotype. The rhetoric of law enforcement
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This prototypical image, the image of the racial enemy,
however invisible to the naked eye is nonetheless visible in the
reactions of whites, mirrored in their fear, loathing and
obsession with controlling him. It is this mask, the mask of the
racial identity itself, and only this mask which the slave
catchers saw: "The stereotype-the mask-defined the African
American as white Americans chose to see him; outside the
mask he was either invisible or threatening."
What indeed was Bibb's crime? His crime is "who he is."
"Who he is" is established by his appearance. His whiskers
could not hide either his race or his gender. Through the
distorting gaze of slave society the simple fact that Bibb was a
black male-free--established "probable cause." This is not
probable cause based on what an individual has done. This is
probable cause imposed on the basis of what an individual
might do.
The notion of the "gaze" is familiar to anyone who has
seen old films. Take the Tarzan series, for example. In the
Tarzan films black savages, with bones through their noses,
capture genteel British explorers, truss and put them in the
cooking pot. In the nick of time, Tarzan, a white man raised by
gives this stereotypical concept a scientific spin. As used by police a profile seems to
refer to a set of characteristics which are thought to function as predictors of
criminality. These characteristics are of two kinds. As Charles Becton explains, "As a
predictive scheme the drug courier profile constitutes a hybridization of clinical and
statistical models." Clinical predictions, based on the subjective judgments of
experienced decision-makers, focus on the uniqueness of individuals. Statistical
predictions rely on "formulas that assign fixed weights to predetermined
characteristics" of individuals.
Charles Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: "All seems infected that th'Infected Spy, As
All Seems Jaundiced to the Jaundic'd Eye," 65 N.C. L. REv. 417 (1987).
These characteristics fall into four categories: environment, evasion,
eccentricity, and earmark.
Environment factors are those from which DEA agents can infer access
to drug distributors or users for example, traveling between source
cities and use cities. Evasion factors are those from which DEA agents
can infer an attempt to avoid surveillance or conceal identity for
example, paying for a ticket with cash and checking no baggage.
Eccentricity factors are those from which DEA agents can infer a state
of emotional arousal-for example, rapid breathing and shaky hands.
Earmark factors are related to status or personal appearance
characteristics of the drug courier-for example, age, race, and gender.
Id. at 438.
' Id. at 12.
"See EDGAR RICE BURROUGHS, TARZAN OF THE APES (1914).
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apes comes to the rescue. Leading a herd of elephants as a
surrogate for the cavalry, Tarzan arrives to save the innocent
white people. In portraying the Africans as savage aggressors
and the British as innocents the Tarzan stories turn upside
down the moral reality of colonialism: By portraying the
British-and Tarzan-as a civilizing force in an uncivilized
jungle, the films implicitly justifies colonialism. One's
enjoyment of the film depends upon taking the racial
perspective of the colonizer. This racial perspective, and the
mechanisms associated with it that make it seem natural,
constitute the "dominant gaze."
Bibb as a free black male appears to the "dominant
gaze" as dangerous and evil as Tarzan's natives. Bibb is seen
as a criminal because slave society needed psychologically to
see him this way: either in chains or as an enemy of the state.
For the Greeks, the image of otherness was the
foreigner who was also a barbarian,45 for Foucault the image of
the other was the mad person,46 but for slave society the
quintessential image of the other is the racial other,
particularly the black male. This racial other has always
represented the enemy to be subdued-much like a dangerous
animal. As Vilo Harle recognized, "The point is there are some
Others who are excluded from among us and are actually
perceived in less human terms, below human beings,
dangerous animals that can and must be killed."7 Only if the
racial other is a dangerous animal/criminal could slave society
justify its cruel practices and constant surveillance.
Racism is traditionally understood as irrational. On the
contrary, it is a perverse expression of rationality.
[RIacism is not simply a stupid hatred. It may be based on ignorance
that breeds hatred, but it is every bit as dependant upon a form of
knowledge. That knowledge, sometimes wittingly used, sometimes
unwittingly, operates to reinforce the fear and hatred of others by
providing rationales for hierarchizing differences.
4 8
45 VILHO HARLE, THE ENEMY WITH A THOUSAND FACES: THE TRADITION OF THE
OTHER IN WESTERN POLITIcAL THOUGHT (2000).
47Id. at 11.
48 THOMiAS DuMsi, THE NEW ENCLOSURES, IN READING RODNEY KING:
READING URBAN UPRISING (Robert Gooding Williams ed., 1993).
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Thus, our dusty old orthodoxy about race holds that
stereotypes are bad. My point is that the fabric of racial
identity is itself woven from stereotypical images.
This framework helps to explain the failure of our civil
rights discourse. The project of racial integration has proceeded
on the assumption that differences between the races are
environmental and that if blacks could have access to
education they could assimilate into the mainstream. In
messianic fashion, the integration strategy assumes that the
burden was on blacks to lift themselves up by their bootstraps
and enter great America. I would argue that our basic images
and notions of race police the border between America and
Africans. Let me tell another story.
B. Guess Who's Coming to Dinner49
In Guess Who's Coming to Dinner0 Sidney Poitier, the
Denzel Washington of his day, portrays a black male who
attempts to break through the barbed wire of an age old racial
taboo: he wishes to marry a white woman.
Sidney is a young black doctor in love with the willful,
colorblind daughter of an old school white businessman
(Spencer Tracy). Wearing a Brooks Brothers suit and a smile
as his armor, Sidney comes to the white family's dinner table
both as guest and as would be harbinger of the modern age of
race relations.
The film thematizes not merely the moral anxiety over
the sexual designs of black males. It posed, dramatically, the
social and political question of the place of the black male in
the new world order following the dismantling-officially at
least-of segregation and the racial ideology on which it rested.
Sidney's black male is affluent, culturally hip, and
doomed. Striving to be American and black, a rugged
individualist and a representative of his race, Sidney lives split
between worlds, and split inside himself.
Sidney is, as the black male in the white mind always
is, an abstraction: in this case the embodiment of a modern
49 D. Marvin Jones, Guess Who's Coming to Dinner, in RACE, SEX AND
SUSPICIoN 49 (forthcoming 2002).
6 Guess Who's Coming to Dinner (Columbia Pictures 1967).
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liberalism. This liberalism, rising like a phoenix out of the
ashes of World War II-a war against Nazism-dreamed in the
colors of the rainbow. This new liberalism rejected the idea
that race in a biological sense determined who one was. 1 The
popular liberal impulse, released by the catharsis of war,
converged with other streams. Anthropologists like Franz Boaz
and Otto Kleinberg began unbuilding the myth that
intelligence and other mental characteristics had anything to
do with heredity: "Culture not racial inheritance was the
principle shaping force in determining mental characteristics
of a people.""2 Where classical sociology had attributed the
poverty of blacks to innate laziness and instability, E. Franklin
Frazier, and Charles Johnson, standing on the shoulders of W.
E. B. Dubois began to trace black economic inferiority to
environmental causes involving racism. Of course the most
pivotal work here was that of Gunnar Myrdal, whose post-war
bombshell of a book, An American Dilemma' was cited in the
Brown v. Board of Education" decision itself. Myrdal argues
that the practice of segregation was inconsistent with
America's own creed and in effect was an obstacle in the road
of America's national destiny.
The historical moment of the Harlem renaissance was
nourished by and itself fed into this liberal impulse. As Toni
Morrison wrote in Playing in the Dark,5 Daniel DeFoe's
Robinson Crusoe was "the man" because he had access to
language. Man Friday, who lacks access to language and
cannot speak, never becomes fully a person, hence he is "Man
Friday." Through the writers of the Harlem renaissance, blacks
had begun to find their voice, radically transforming the image
of blacks as they transformed themselves through their art.
6' As OMI and WINANT write: "With the advent of the vaguely egalitarian
(racially speaking) vision of the new deal and of the anti-fascism of World War II...
the ethnic paradigm definitively dislodged the biologic view in what appeared to be a
triumph of liberalism." MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 14 (1986).62 See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 1975 (characterizing the conclusions
of FRANZ BOAZ, THE MIND OF PRIMITIVE MAN (1922)).
GUNNAR MYRDHAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO AND THE PROBLEM
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1944).
54 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARm WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY
IMAGINATION (1992).
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These streams of liberal thought converge on one point:
only culture, language, and shared values-varying like the
colors of the rainbow-define the boundaries of the American
community." These newfound streams of liberalism fed into a
larger river, the legitimating myth of America as a melting pot.
In a ritual of Americanization, Henry Ford had foreign
workers enter one end of a giant clay pot wearing their
national costumes and come out the other end in American
business suits.57 The talisman of belief in the American creed-
in this case the creed of capitalism symbolized by the business
suit-had given them a new identity as Americans.
If the black male is always merely a product of the
white society's gaze, Sidney is its product as it looks at the
black male through the lens of the melting pot story. Through
this lens the image of Sidney looks "right." He is well dressed,
meticulously pronouncing all the endings on his words, trying
heroically in his behavior to overawe the degraded image of his
phenotype. Sidney is a doctor, who happens to be a black male.
Thus, it was not Sidney's race or gender that defined him. It
was the values he had chosen as reflected by his Ivy League
degrees and his Brooks Brothers suit.
In these terms, Sidney's character personified a social
proposition: race was like a national costume and could be
taken off and exchanged for an American identity. It was
axiomatic of cold war liberalism-this was the essence of the
Brown decision, I think-that not only was the assimilation of
blacks possible, but a moral imperative. As Myrdal wrote in his
classic An American Dilemma: "If America in actual practice
could show the world a progressive trend by which the Negro
finally became integrated into modern democracy, all mankind
would be given faith again-it would have reason to believe
that peace, progress and order are feasible." 8 Within this
retelling of the melting pot story the immigrant analogy was
implicit: "there are no essential differences-in relation to the
6Id. at 14.
67 Joe E. Fagin, Old Poison In New Bottles, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW
NATIVSIM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 26 (Juan Perea
ed., 1997).
See generally MYRDAL, supra note 53.
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larger society-between the third world oi racial minorities
and the European ethnic groups." 9
It is precisely this story of the melting pot reinvented as
a "table" that animated Dr. King's appeal: "I have a dream that
one day on the red hills of Georgia the sons of former slaves
and the sons of former slaveholders will be able to sit down at
the table of brotherhood.""0
But there is a split here. Along the axis of race the split
is between what Myrdal referred to as the American belief in
equality and its practice. It flounders simultaneously on the
axis of American identity itself: between two readings of the
American story. One is the story of the America as a great e
pluribus unum, out of many one, the America of Dr. King, of
Langston Hughes in his poem "I, Too:"
I, too, sing America/
I am the darker brother/...
I, too, am America.61
The other story of America is the one expressed in Dred
Scott,62 holding that a black man was incapable of becoming an
American citizen, the America of the Chinese Exclusion Act,
the America of the World War II internment of the Japanese. It
was this story which Henry Pratt Fairchild, past president of
the American Sociological Association, expressed in 1926 when
he said: "If America is to remain a stable nation, it must
continue a white man's country for an indefinite period to
come."63 This story of America as a white man's country
ironically coexisted with efforts to expand the American myth
to blacks.
The split between these two stories about American
identity-America as the land of the free and America as the
land for white people-signifies a deeper psychological conflict:
between modem liberalism and the needs of whites to claim
racial superiority. As Dubois pointed out in Black
9 Id.
60 Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have A Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), in PENGUIN BOOK
OF TWENTIETH CENTURY SPEECHES 330 (Brian McArthur ed., 1992).61 Id.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
Fagin, supra note 57, at 26.
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Reconstruction, the wages of whiteness consisted of privileges
with respect to jobs, and social status." The legal and
intellectual orthodoxy of blacks as just another ethnic group
floundered on deeply engrained cultural norms that required
that white skin remain a badge of privilege.
Thus through the colorblind lens of the film's orthodoxy,
Sidney comes to dinner as an American: the very fact that he
does so is a living witness that in America all can sit at the
family table so long as they have the right moral credentials.
But the orthodoxy of liberal intellectuals does not dissolve
ideology that has been deeply entrenched.
Antonio Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks 5 observed that
after the Italians had overthrown the official apparatus of
fascism he discovered the government was only an outer ditch
and that behind it the massive ideology of fascism was left
untouched. There is a similar story to be told about the
overthrow of the regime of segregation in the United States.
Thus, whites in the South openly, and many whites in
the North covertly, never accepted the premise that blacks
were just another ethnic group. As late as 1991 a New York
Times poll found that 66% of whites were opposed to a relative
marrying a black person." The meaning of segregation as
Gunnar pointed out in his post-war classic, was that while
European groups could be assimilated the blacks could not. 7
The anti-immigrant story of America as a white man's country
not only continued to resonate but also was knotted together
with the anti-black story of "Negro inferiority."
"We Americans seem to have blundered about in our
history with two clumsy contrivances strapped to our backs,
unreconciled and weighty: our democratic traditions and
race."' The synergy between these two stories splits Sidney in
two. Sidney's project was to transform himself into an
American in order to transform himself into a man: no longer a
6See WILLIAM EDWARD BURGHARDT DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN
AMERICA 700 (1962).
65 See ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF
ANTONIO GRAMSCI (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. and trans., 1971).
ELLIS COSE, COLOR-BLIND: SEEING BEYOND RACE IN A RACE OBSESSED
WORLD 8 (1997).
MYRDAL, supra note 53, at 928.
8Gerald Early, Performance and Reality: Race and Sports and the Modern
World, THE NATION, Aug. 10, 1998, at 11.
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black man but simply a man. He sought finally to be whole, no
longer merely a body or a pair of hands. Instead he is split in
two. One of him remains in the world of the colorless
individual, one of him does not. He lives in two worlds. In the
world of liberal theory, a world that extends to court opinions,
to official policy, to speeches by Presidents, to the conscious
thoughts of enlightened people, Sidney is simply an individual,
an American.
But, Sidney also lives in a world of private thoughts, a
world in which the majority of white people still do not want
their relative to marry one of "them." In this world America is
still "white man's country." Here Sidney's visual image leads to
visceral reaction both for whites and the black male who seeks
to "pass":
Look, a Negro!"
Mama, see the Negro! I'm frightened! Frightened!"...
I could no longer laugh, because I already knew that there
were legends, stories, history... Then assailed at various points, the
corporeal schema crumbled, its place taken by a racial epidermal
schema.... I moved toward the other... and the evanescent other,
hostile but not opaque, transparent, not there, disappeared. Nausea.
I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race,
my ancestors....
I discovered my blackness and I was battered down by Tom-
toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetischism, racial defects,
slave-ships, and above all else, above all: "sho good eatin."69
From this perspective, Sidney at Spencer Tracy's dinner table,
surrounded by Spencer Tracy's white wife, white daughter,
white Irish Catholic priest, looks "out of place." He is, if not a
fly in the buttermilk, still a stranger in the village, much like
James Baldwin, if we can picture him, when he visited the
Alps."0 He is a foreigner.
The black male carries his border with him, in his skin.
Neither place of birth, nor acts of Congress change his
citizenship. He remains the central character in a story about
how some groups are simply incapable of being truly American.
c9 FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SIN, WHITE MASKS 112 (1967).
70 James Baldwin, Stranger in the Village, in THE PRICE OF THE TICKET 79
(1985).
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Jean Paul Sartre provides an analogy for us. 1 Sartre noted
that despite years of residence and significant economic and
cultural achievements, Jews remain "the unassimilated at the
very heart of [French] society":
[The Jew] accepts the society around him, he joins the game and he
conforms to all the ceremonies, dancing with the others the dance of
respectability. Besides, he is nobody's slave; he is a free citizen
under a regime that allows free competition; he is forbidden no social
dignity, no office of the state. He may be decorated with the ribbon of
the Legion of Honor; he may become a great lawyer or a cabinet
minister. But at the very moment when he reaches the summits of
legal society, another society-amorphous, diffused, and
omnipresent-appears before him as if in brief flashes of lightning
and refuses to take him in.... [HIe never encounters any particular
resistance; people seem, rather, to be in flight before him; an
impalpable chasm widens out, and, above all, an invisible chemistry
devaluates all he touches.... Everything is accessible to him, and
yet he possesses nothing; for, he is told, what one possesses is not to
be bought.
72
As Frantz Fanon has noted the situation of blacks in a
white society is analogous, but worse: "[Tihe Jew can be
unknown in his Jewishness .. . . His actions, his behavior is
the final determinant. He is a white man, and . . . can
sometimes go unnoticed. [But] I am the slave not of the 'idea'
that others have of me but of my own appearance."7 3 No matter
where he is born the black male is an alien. He is alien not in
the language he speaks, perhaps not in the values he holds in
his heart. He is alien in terms of his mythic essence: his
incorrigible sexuality, his propensity for chaos.
Similarly, our prototypical image of race operates as a
lens, which intercepts the person of color precisely at the point
at which s/he seeks to interrogate the dominant discourse. The
same racial boundaries, which demarcated separate railroad
cars for blacks and whites, demarcate separate space for blacks
and white scholars to participate in discourse. Let me explain
what I mean again through the agency of a story.
In 1839, Spanish slavers herd a group of kidnapped
Africans aboard the schooner Amistad, bound from Havana,
7 1 JEAN PAUL SARTRE, ANTI-SEMITE AND JEW 83 (G. Becker trans., 1948).
72 Id.
FANON, supra note 69, at 115.
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Cuba to another Cuban Port, Puerto Principe." Miraculously,
the Africans escape their bonds. Led by the now famous
Cinque75 they steal long bladed sugar cane knives and take
control of the very ship in which they were held as cargo."6 But
why did Cinque fight? Slavery involved the uprooting of
indigenous people from family, soil, and culture. It was not
merely an act of physical brutality, but a process of
systematically erasing the slave as an African or even a person
at all. The hold of the slave ship where hapless Africans were
laid spoon fashion in blood and filth, was the moral opposite of
the womb: from the belly of the slave ship nothing human
emerged.77 What emerged was received as a slave, who by
definition was stripped of everything that counted as human
identity." Henry Louis Gates tells a story about a slave who
was asked about his "self." The slave replied, "I isn't got no
self."" As I see him, Cinque fought to cross back over a line
that separated not only home and alien territory, freedom and
oppression, but also the line between having a name-a sense
of who one is-and being nameless. In a sense Cinque fought to
keep not only his body but also his "self' from being stolen, lost,
or erased.
Although the Africans wrest the power over the ship,
they lack the navigational skills to find their way home.
Sparing and later trusting a Spanish navigator named
Montes ° who promptly tricks them by sailing East by day and
North or West by night, zigzagging up the American coast.
74 CHRISTOPHER MARTIN, THE AMiISTAD AFFAIR 35-36 (1970).
75 Cinque would appear to be an Anglicization of Joseph Cinquez, the name
the Spanish slavers gave to the African known as Sinbe. Id. at 32. Reluctantly I use
Cinque's slave name only because it is the name popular culture has inextricably
associated with the historical African person of the story.
76 See generally id.
77 See ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 7 (1982) (speaking of the gulf between the slave -and the community of
Christians, and civilized persons: '[Giradually there emerged, however, something new
in the conception of the black servant: the view that he did not belong to the same
community of Christian, civilized Europeans").
78 KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-
BELLUM SOUTH 109-24 (1956); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN
ATnTUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1968).7 9 HENRY LOUIS GATES, RACE, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (1985).
WIIAMI OWENS, SLAVE MUTINY 71-110 (1953).
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Objectively, Cinque's struggle resonated in terms of
values Americans had inscribed in blood into their own story of
origins. But eventually these Patrick Henry-like rebels landed
on Montauk Point, Long Island.8' Of course, Cinque and thirty-
eight surviving Africans were promptly captured and indicted
for murder." Although the indictments were later dismissed,
the Africans were still held to determine whether or not they
were properly denominated as cargo or people.
In the Steven Spielberg film which attempts to retell
this story, a venerable American sage, John Quincy Adams
comes to the rescue,-he rescues not only the Africans but the
American legal system from the indictment of history.
Representing the Africans as kidnap victims who had a right to
be free by all necessary means. While the film provides a
storybook ending, with Cinque clothed in white robes of
innocence returning to his native shores, the return home was
not quite so simple a proposition for the Africans. Although
they are freed by a Supreme Court decision-that affirmed
dryly only that they were free Negroes and not slaves -- the
Africans do not go home for many months. This is where
Spielberg's story trails off. In order to raise money for the
voyage back to what is now Sierra Leone, Cinque and the
others must work. He does this in part by giving speeches in
the Mende language, by doing tricks, and by presenting
himself to be gawked at much like an animal in a menagerie or
ZOO.85
81 MARTIN, supra note 74, at 52-53.
2 Id. at 60.
AmISTAD (DreamWorks 1998).
United States v. Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 595 (1841). The Supreme Court
orders the Africans freed in a surgically precise opinion that affirmed the rights of the
kidnapped Africans under a particular treaty without touching the moral, or
international human rights issues profoundly intertwined in the facts of the case. That
court opinion turns on the formal distinction between slave and free Negro, and fails to
reach the issue either the morality or criminality of the treatment of the Africans
themselves.
It is also a most important consideration in the present case, which
ought not to be lost sight of, that, supposing these African negroes not
to be slaves, but kidnapped, and free negroes, the treaty with Spain
cannot be obligatory upon them; and the United States are bound to
respect their rights as much as those of Spanish subjects.
Id.
&5 See MARTIN, supra note 74, at 208-10; OWENS, supra note 80, at 291-93.
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Throughout the story, Cinque's every act is seen
through a lens. It is this lens, which refracts Cinque's
quintessentially human act of rebellion into an act of murder
for which he is indicted. Through this lens Cinque is not and
never becomes an individual endowed with inalienable rights,
but appears as a slave who killed his master. Cinque places
himself squarely within the circle of the dominant majority's
stereotypes, doing tricks, performing as and conforming to a
reverse image of him, in order to make money. As Cinque and
the other Africans were placed on display in a church in
Farmington by their abolitionist "friends," "[miothers held
tightly to their babies-making sure they would never become
tempting morsels for tattooed cannibals."86 In performing as he
does, it is an interesting question whether Cinque trades for
money the very quality of identity that he fought originally to
retain. We are free today of the curse of slavery, but in what
sense are the performances of black scholars free of the curse of
Cinque.
What are the implications of Steve Winter being right;
that we can never separate what we perceive from the
prototypical images we bring to the process of perception. How
do we expose the trope of identity from behind the screen of
prototypical-and tropological-images of race. How do we
enter discourse, much less challenge power relationships when
before we write, before we stand up to speak, these caricatured
images of racial identity proceed us as much as they proceeded
Cinque. Henry Louis Gates poses the question eloquently: "Can
writing, the very difference it makes and marks, mask the
blackness of the face that addresses the text of Western letters,
in a voice that speaks English, in an idiom that contains an
irreducible element of cultural difference that shall always
separate the white voice from the black.""7
I wonder.
OWENS, supra note 80, at 288.
HENRY Louis GATES, Writing, Race, and the Difference It Makes, in LOOSE
CANONS 67 (1992).
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